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ABSTRACT

SOCIAL COMPENSATION AND SOCIAL LOAFING: THE EFFECTS OF INCENTIVE,
TRUST LEVEL, GENDER, AND COWORKER PERFORMANCE

Bems, Steven Francis
University of Dayton, 1994
Advisor:

Charles E. Kimble, Ph.D.

Previous research (Harkins and Szymanski, 1988, 1989) has shown
that work group members tend to loaf when their contributions are

not identifiable or when a group has no objective standard.

Other

research (Williams and Karau, 1991) suggests that expectations
about co-worker performance affect how people perform in groups:
for instance, people who report lower trust levels have displayed

a tendency to compensate for other work group members.

The

present study included factors associated with social loafing and

some of those associated with social compensation.

The study also

included multiple trials, so the experimenter was provided with a

way to determine if people will repeatedly compensate.

It was

found that teamed low trusters displayed significantly more
improvement than teamed high trusters over the course of trials.

High trusters performed better as individuals than as team

members, especially when an incentive was provided.

found that females did not perform the same as males:

It was also
Males

tended to compensate for their partners, regardless of trust
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level, while only low trust females attempted to compensate.

High

trust females who worked in teams failed to perform as well as

they did in practice, so they essentially loafed.
findings are discussed.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

People are often called upon to participate in group activities

because the output of a single individual does not always satisfy task
demands.

Group members often supply expert knowledge or abilities

which are unique, therefore groups can usually achieve much more than

isolated individuals. Since the 1880s, social psychologists have been
attempting to identify factors which might moderate the amount of

effort being supplied by group members.

In a classic rope-pulling

study, Ringlemann (1913), it was found that people tend to work harder

on individual tasks than on collective tasks.

A secondary source,

Kravitz and Martin (1986), explains that those subjects who thought
that their efforts were being pooled with a group's did not pull as

hard.

This phenomenon, originally referred to as the Ringlemann

Effect, is now termed social loafing.

The new terminology is much

more descriptive, for it asserts that group members do not always work
to their full potential when they are working with others.

Social loafing has been observed when individual contributions to a

group product cannot be identified.

Williams, Harkins, and Latane

(1981) found that when people were asked to cheer, those who were

wearing earphones which allowed them to hear only other people (and
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not themselves) had a tendency to exert less effort.

The above

researchers suggest that social loafing can actually be eliminated
when individual contributions are identifiable.

The research of

Harkins and Jackson (1985) suggests that the ability to identify
individual contributions is one of two factors which mediate social
loafing.

Harkins and Jackson state that group members also require an

objective standard so that they themselves can evaluate their group’s
performance.

Harkins and Jackson found that participants were not

quite as industrious at generating a list of uses for an object when

others were working with different objects, despite the fact that both
group and individual outputs were identified.

Participants apparently

felt that their list could not be compared to others.

Further support

is provided by Harkins and Szymanski (1989) in which participants
perform a variety of tasks under a wide variety of conditions (group-

standard, individual-standard, group-no standard, and individual-no
standard).

Those working in the group-standard condition did as well

as those in the individual conditions while those participating in a
group without a standard tended to loaf.

One question which arises

from this area of research has to do with whether or not people would

work as hard at a task when they are told that some unspecified
performance standard exists and that they have either succeeded or

failed in achieving that standard.

Brickner, Ostrom, and Harkins (1986) indicates that personal

involvement also has an impact on one’s tendency to engage in social

loafing.

In the above study, the experimental task (involving thought
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generation) was manipulated so that participants were either asked to

comment on a proposal which would affect them greatly (a senior
competency exam for the next year) or one which would not affect them
(an exam for another school or one proposed six years in the future).

Significantly more responses were produced when the proposal had
personal meaning.

Personal meaning was equated with intrinsic

importance or with an outcome of significant consequence.
Jackson and Williams (1985) indicates that social loafing is more

likely when a collective task (a task which is accomplished by working
with and depending upon others) is simple.

The above researchers

found that people solve a simple maze best when working in the mere
presence of others (better than when working alone or collectively),
but tend to perform the poorest when attempting to solve a difficult

maze in the presence of others.

The mere presence of others appeared

to increase drive which, in turn, increased the likelihood of a

dominant response (a correct answer on a simple problem or an
incorrect answer on a difficult problem).

The ability to work with

others apparently allows one to relax, for one can depend upon others
for aid:

Less drive would exist when one is working alone or as part

of a team, therefore the dominant response is less likely.

Given the

above, one would be more likely to select an incorrect response to a

difficult problem when working in the mere presence of others, but

less likely to select an incorrect response when working on a simple
problem in the presence of others.

The conclusion one might draw from

the above is that one should attempt a difficult task by working alone
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or as part of a team.

Perhaps at the heart of those situations in which social loafing

occurs is what is termed a social dilemma by Orbell and Dawes (1981).
Another term for the same situation would be the public/collective

goods problem (Platt, 1973).

Regardless of terminology, one is faced

with the decision of whether or not to expend personal resources such
as effort to aid in the pursuit of a group goal or product.

While it

might be in one's best interest to remain idle and let someone else do
the work or take risks for the sake of the entire group, people will

often cooperate in achieving the task at hand.

Social psychologists

are currently examining when and why group members do not expend the
same amount of effort as they do when working alone or in the mere

presence of others.

There are numerous situations in which people

must consider whether or not to engage in social loafing.

In each

case, people must decide whether or not personal efforts are in some

way dispensable to completion of the group's task.

Some people

obviously loaf when the answer to this question is affirmative.
Platt (1973) suggests that a social trap is more likely to be overcome

when there is a short term negative consequence to selfish behavior
which does not aid the group or when there is a short term positive
consequence to behavior which does aid the group.

Kerr (1983) indicates that social loafing is more likely when group
members recognize that others are not contributing their share of the

work.

In the above study, people appeared to become less motivated to

pump air through a "flowmeter" not only when their capable partner
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consistently succeeded, but also when their able partner consistently
failed.

A reduction in effort was not induced when one's partner was

incapable or when participants were working in the presence of someone
else.

Kerr (1983) essentially provided an opportunity to observe

social loafing along with what he describes as the "sucker effect".

Participants in the above study became less motivated (and failed to
perform as well) when they were teamed with a fictitious capable

partner who either consistently succeeded or who consistently failed.
Participants evidently decided that their efforts were dispensable

when a capable partner succeeded.

When, on the other hand, capable

partners consistently failed, some participants evidently tried to

avoid being stuck with all of the work (the sucker role) by failing as
well.

Kerr has suggested that people try to avoid playing the sucker

role because they simply wish to avoid being taken advantage of.

The

sucker role is uncomfortable because the other person is violating

several social norms:

When one person does all of the work, the

equity norm is violated, for their level of contribution does not gain

them a higher level of reward.

The norm of social responsibility is

also violated, for everyone within a group is expected to reciprocate.

An incapable partner would not actually be violating these norms, so
Kerr's hypothesis appears to be quite viable.
One specific situation in which group members will work harder at a

collective task is one in which students are required to produce a
group paper or group presentation.

Williams and Karau (1991) suggests

that some people will engage in behavior which they describe as social
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compensation because they believe that other group members are either

less competent or tend to rely upon them to do most of the work.

The

most extreme forms of social compensation would supposedly occur when

a group member does not trust others and places a high value on the

group/team

product.

In the classroom situation, students who do not

place great trust in others would compensate most if they need a good

grade and expect to make some difference by working harder.

It would

appear that the hypotheses produced by Williams and Karau (1991) are

consistent with expectancy-value models (Vroom, 1964) to the extent
that they would not expect to observe social compensation if people

feel incapable of changing the situation or if people do not value the

group product.
Williams and Karau suggest that while it was not recognized, social

compensation may have actually occurred within Kerr (1983), the study
previously described.

Participants in Kerr’s study were asked to work

alone, with a capable partner who succeeded, or with a capable partner

who consistently failed.

A rather unique aspect of Kerr's methodology

is that the experimenter can examine how participants perform after
they have received feedback about how well they and their partner did.

Participants who were teamed with a loafing partner succeeded on seven
of nine trials (75.4% of the time) as opposed to eight of nine trials

(88.9% of the time) in the individual condition.

Williams and Karau

further suggest that had the reward for success been greater within

Kerr's experiment, those working with a loafing partner may have
succeeded even more often.

The reward for success in Kerr's was 25
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cents.

While Kerr stresses that participants who were teamed with a

loafer performed significantly poorer than individual participants
(they let the team fail so that they would not appear to be suckers),

it is Williams and Karau's contention that participants who had been
teamed with a loafing partner actually engaged in social compensation

(their teams succeeded on 75.4% of the trials even though one person
was doing all of the work).

Williams and Karau further suggest that

team participants might have succeeded even more often (more often
than individuals) had they been presented with the appropriate level

of reward.

Criticism such as the above is further supported by

Brickner, Ostrom and Harkins (1986); this study addresses the effect

of task importance/meaningfulness (as previously noted):

Well-

rewarded behavior appeared to have been allotted greater effort than

that which received little reward.

Based upon the above assumptions, Williams and Karau (1991)
conducted a series of three experiments:

In their first experiment,

participants who were previously categorized as being low, medium, or

high trusters (according

to the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale;

Rotter, 1967) were asked

to generate a list of uses for an object

within either a coactive

or collective work condition. Participants

worked in the mere presence
condition.

of another when assigned to the coactive

Those assigned to the collective condition actually worked

with and depended upon the other person.

The above authors found a

significant main effect of trust (medium trusters were less productive

than both low and high trusters) along with a significant trust X work
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decision making would seem to be required.

One way to achieve this

effect would be to use a form of reinforcement which is contingent
upon the participants level of performance (more like the average work
environment).

It was decided that the bonus system used in some

workplaces would be replicated in such a way that the less successful
would stand less chance of receiving a prize.

The effect of incentive

could also be examined if participants are assigned to different

bonus/incentive conditions.
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condition interaction (those who placed less trust in their coworkers

were more productive on collective tasks than on coactive tasks).

The second experiment involved a manipulation of coworker effort (a
confederate stated that they planned to work very hard or not so hard)

and the task was described as being rather meaningful (the brainstorm
ing task was described as a metric for intelligence testing, thus

participants would desire to perform well).

The principal finding in

experiment two was that participants seemed to compensate for someone
who did not plan to work hard (those teamed with a low effort partner

did as well as those who worked alone and better than those working
with a high effort co-worker).

Experiment three involved the same

work condition manipulation along with a manipulation of co-worker
ability (able, not able) and a manipulation of task meaningfulness

(the study was portrayed to be of either great importance to the
experimenter or of little importance).

Coactive participants tended

to do better than team participants at low task meaningfulness, at

both levels of co-worker ability, and at high co-worker effort.

Team

participants did work harder when they perceived that their partner
was not able, however, so social compensation occurred as expected.
Despite the criticisms which have been leveled against Kerr (1983),

there would appear to be an advantage to using Kerr's multiple trial
sequence, for it allows one to examine any motivational losses or

gains which might result from the various experimental conditions.
has been specifically suggested that there was a problem with Kerr's
use of reward, so a reward which has greater impact upon one's

It

CHAPTER II

THE EXPERIMENT

The purpose of the present study is to examine how trust level
(high and low), work condition (individual and team), and incentive
(incentive, no incentive) affect one’s performance on a word
recognition task.

The best way to examine how the above variables

interact would theoretically be through a fusion of the Williams and

Karau (1991) study and the Kerr (1983) study.

It was predicted that

there would be a Trust X Incentive X Work Condition interaction such

that high trusters working for no incentive in the collective work

condition would perform the poorest while low trusters working for an
incentive within the collective condition would perform the best.

Other predictions were that the presence of an incentive would

affect high trusters more than low trusters (a Trust by Incentive
interaction) and that low trusters would be more productive in the

collective/team condition (a Trust by Work Condition interaction as

in Williams and Karau, 1991).
A main effect of work condition was expected, for the task would

not involve difficult forms of information processing and simple
tasks tend to be performed better in coactive environments (Jackson

and Williams, 1985).
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Despite the fact that performance standards were not specified

and only general feedback was provided, a main effect of incentive was
expected, for Brickner, Ostrom, and Harkins (1986) indicates that
important tasks receive greater amounts of effort.

Lastly, a main effect of trust was expected, for Williams and

Karau (1991) indicates that high trusters (and medium trusters)
tend to be less productive in general (presumably due to their

tendency to loaf during instances when low trusters might try to
compensate).

Method

Design

The design was a 2(male v. female) by 2(individual v. team) by
2 (incentive v. no incentive) by 2 (high trust level v. low trust
level) by 3 (trial 1 v. trial 2 v. trial 3) mixed factorial with a

total of 80 participants either passively or randomly assigned to each
of the resulting cells.

covariate measure.

Practice performance was treated as a

Participants were students who were taking part

in experimentation in order to obtain course credit for a first year

level psychology course.
Procedure

After being shown to individual lab rooms, participants were

asked to respond to a ’’survey” described as being unrelated to the
experiment for which they had volunteered.

The survey was actually

a computerized version of Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale.

When
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participants completed the Rotter Scale, the computer would thank
them by participant number (this number was actually their score on

the trust scale).

Participants were classified as high or low

trusters based upon whether they were above or below the sample mean

for each gender.

Equal numbers from each gender were then randomly

assigned to a work condition and incentive level.

At this point, all

participants were asked to fill out an informed consent form which

basically stated that they would be working on a word recognition task

either alone or with a partner.

All were then asked to practice the

experimental word recognition task.

The task involved finding a pre

specified four-letter word which was hidden within a 34 by 36 field of

scrambled letters.
times.

The target word appeared within each page 55

In order to prevent participants from keeping track of how

many locations they had already found, participants were asked to

switch pages at every one minute time interval over the course of each

five minute trial.

Participants were asked to circle locations on a

transparent sheet protector so that scoring might proceed faster and

paper could be conserved.

A computerized timer program caused a

single beep to sound whenever participants were required to switch
pages.

A double beep signaled the end of each trial.

After the

practice trial, participants were told that the experimenter would
take some time to examine how well they did.

After about five

minutes, the experimenter came back and stated that the new objective
would be to exceed one’s practice performance.

Those who were

participating as part of a team were told that their scores would be
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added to the other person’s and that their team had to circle more
locations than they did in practice in order to succeed.

The

experimenter then explained that a poor individual performance would

not hurt the team as long as the other person was able to make up for

the difference.

Those participating within the incentive condition

were provided with a stack of 24 poker chips and told that if they/
their team succeeded on each trial, they would retain all of their
poker chips, otherwise a number of chips would be withdrawn (this

number depending upon the extent of their failure).

Each poker chip

was described as a separate entry in a future $20 drawing.
Following the conclusion of the first performance trial (in which
participants circled a new four-letter target word) and a sufficient
amount of time to examine how well participants did, the experimenter

presented some contrived feedback:

Individuals were told that they

had circled 10% more locations than they had found in the practice
trial.

Team participants were told that their team had done a little

over 2% better, for they had found 10% more locations while their

partners had found 5% fewer.

Feedback was contrived in such a

way in order to retain control and to make team participants believe

that a capable partner was loafing.

The stack of poker chips

presented to those in the incentive condition then remained untouched.

After a second performance trial in which a new four-letter word
was presented, all participants were again presented with contrived
feedback:

Individuals were told that they had located 5% fewer unique

locations than in practice.

Team participants were told that their
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team had done a little over 7% worse, for they had circled 5% fewer
locations and their partner had circled 10% fewer.

The consequence of

’’failure” in the incentive condition was the loss of 8 poker chips.
The third performance trial proceeded in the same fashion, but was
followed immediately by a questionnaire which served as a manipulation

check.

Participants were specifically asked if they could recall the

outcome of preceding trials and a section of mood level items was used
to determine whether or not the experimental factors had any effect

upon mood (the scale consisted of 11 items such as ’’happy", ’’ashamed",

and "angry"; see Appendix A).

After participants had completed the

questionnaire, the experimenter sought to detect suspicion about the
true nature of the study by asking additional questions such as "Do

you feel that this was a good way to measure the effect of time
pressure?", "Were you surprised by any of the performance feedback?",

and "Do you feel that your partner performed as you expected?".

A

debriefing followed in which participants were allowed to read about

the reasons for the study, the approval process, and how they might
learn more about the subject if interested (see Appendix B for the
debriefing form).

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Mixed factorial analyses of covariance were applied to the data.
The dependent variable in this study was the number of unique
locations circled on five identical forms during the course of each

trial.

The only within-subjects variable was trial.

Four trials were

involved in the study, so a new four letter word was used in each.

The order in which these four words were used was randomized.

The

dependent measure was considered to be very sensitive to any motiv
ation losses or gains because word recognition is a rather well-

practiced skill.

Practice effects were predicted to be minimal for

the same reason.

Practice trial performance was treated as a

covariate measure to compensate for any pre-existing individual
differences.

See Table la and lb for the entire set of cell means.

One primary concern during examination of the data was whether or
not there would be an interaction between work condition and trust
level, for it was predicted that low trusters working within teams

would perform the best while high trusters working within teams would
perform the poorest.

The results proved to be much more complex than

originally expected, because gender interacted with trust level and

work condition in such a way that the above prediction was only true
for females.

Analysis revealed a Gender X Work Condition X Trust
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Table la
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust,
Gender, Incentive and Trial at the Individual Level

High Male Inc
High Male Noinc
High Fem Inc
High Fem Noinc
Low Male Inc
Low Male Noinc
Low Fem Inc
Low Fem Noinc
Column Mean

Practice
36.8
29.4
38.6
37.0
36.6
30.4
39.0
35.2
35.4

Trial 1
39.0
30.6
43.2
43.2
41.2
33.0
39.4
40.6
38.8

Trial 2
38.6
32.2
43.8
39.4
42.8
37.2
38.4
43.0
39.4

Trial 3
42.8
35.0
43.6
41.6
45.0
35.6
39.4
39.8
40.4

Row Mean*
40.1
32.6
43.5
41.4
43.0
35.3
39.1
41.2

* Practice trial performance was used as a covariate measure;
therefore, practice scores were not included in the Row Means.
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Table lb
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust,
Gender, Incentive and Trial at the Team Level

High Male Inc
High Male Noinc
High Fern Inc
High Fern Noinc
Low Male Inc
Low Male NoInc
Low Fern Inc
Low Fern Noinc
Column Mean

Practice
35.8
36.0
36.6
39.2
33.6
32.0
33.8
30.2
34.7

Trial 1
37.4
42.0
35.6
38.8
37.8
36.6
41.2
40.4
38.7

Trial 2
39.6
43.3
36.0
40.0
40.0
39.6
46.2
41.2
40.7

Trial 3
42.8
47.2
39.6
38.6
40.8
39.8
40.2
40.6
41.2

Row Mean*
39.9
44.1
37.0
39.2
39.6
38.7
42.6
40.7

* Practice trial performance was used as a covariate measure;
therefore, practice scores were not included in the Row Means.
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Level interaction, F(1,63)=9.32, p<.01, which occurred because the

simple interaction effects of Trust Level and Work Condition were

not the same for each gender.

See Figures la and lb.

Further analysis revealed that the Trust Level X Work Condition
interaction was significant for females, F(l,31)=10.27, p<.01, but
not for males.

Figure lb shows that while high trust females scored

high in the individual condition, they did not score as high in the

team condition.

There is also indication that males did not perform

as predicted since the interaction was not significant for males as
well.
Still further analysis revealed a significant simple effect of

Trust Level for females participating in teams, F(l,15)=20.30, pc.OOl.

It would appear that the low trust females performed better than the

high trust females within the team condition.
The above simple interaction was also the source of a significant
simple effect of Work Condition for high trust females, F(l,15)=7.17,
p<.05.

The high trust females basically performed better in the

individual condition.

The above provides partial support for the

prediction that high trust participants would perform best within the

individual condition.
While it was predicted that incentive would interact with trust
level and work condition such that the best performers would be
low trusters working for an incentive within teams and the poorest
performers would be high trusters working without an incentive within
teams, the Trust Level X Work Condition X Incentive interaction was

19

LOW 1 L

- High TL

Figure la
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust,
Gender and Work Condition (Male Data Only)
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LowTL

High TL

Figure lb
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust,
Gender and Work Condition (Female Data Only)
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not significant.

It was also predicted that there would be an interaction between
trust level and incentive, for it was theorized that high trusters

would be more heavily influenced by an incentive, particularly at

the team level (the teamed low trusters would theoretically attempt
to compensate, so an incentive would provide only diminished gains in
performance).

The above interaction was not significant, however.

A main effect of Trust Level was also expected, but it was not

significant.

Trust Level was actually a rather important factor

within interactions which have already been described.
The prediction that there would be a main effect of work condition

was not supported as far as the dependent measure is concerned, but
there is ample indication that work condition did play an important
role within the study.

The previously described simple effect of

Work Condition for high trust females certainly suggests that work

condition was a factor as far as female behavior is concerned.

The

high trust females actually performed just as all high trusters had
been expected to perform.

Work condition also had an effect upon the

mood levels, for the team condition was more satisfying.

The team

participants (M=3.13) reported that they were not only more thrilled
than the individuals (M=1.95), F(l,63)=7.43, p<.01, but they as team

participants (M=5.05) also reported that they took more pride in their
performance than individuals (M=3.49), F(l,62)=5.47, p<.05.
It was also found that Trial interacted with Gender.

The Gender X

Trial interaction, F(2,128)=4.12, p<.05, is shown in Figure 2.

Still
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further analysis revealed a significant simple effect of Trial for
males, F(2,64)=10.21, p<.001, which (in the present circumstances)
indicates that male showed a significant level of improvement over the
course of the experiment.

There was no simple effect for females.

A main effect of Trial, F(2,128)=4.84, p<.01, was also found.

This main effect did, of course, occur within the context of the

Gender x Trial interaction.

Figure 3 shows that there was a general

trend of improvement which must have been at least partly the result

of male improvement.

As previously mentioned, trial was included as

an independent variable so that any motivational losses or gains might
be identified.

It was predicted that there would be a main effect of incentive

upon task performance, but none was found.

It is quite possible that

the effect was overshadowed by the effects of other factors such as
trust level and/or work condition.

What was encouraging is that there

was a significant difference in the self-reported mood levels of
participants:

Those participating in the incentive condition reported

that they were more disappointed (M=3.63) with their performance than

those in the no-incentive condition (M=1.70), F( 1,64)=14.99, p<.001.
Those participating in the incentive condition also reported higher
levels of frustration (M=3.78) than those who received no incentive
(M=2.15), F(l,64)=10.06, p<.01.

Incentive did play at least a minor

role in the study based upon the above.
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Figure 2
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of
Gender and Trial
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Figure 3
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Trial

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Previous research on social compensation has suggested that low

trusters will perform best in teams while high trusters will perform
best as individuals:

In the present study, low trust males responded

to the experimental conditions much differently than the low trust
females (the interaction between Trust Level and Work Condition for

females was one result).

The simple Gender X Work Condition

interaction for high trusters also indicates that the high trust males
behaved contrary to expectation.

The males, who had been expected to

engage in social loafing, actually performed best in the team

condition.

Previous research in social compensation and social

loafing has provided no indication that gender plays a vital role, so

it was quite surprising to find that gender interacted as it did.
Gender obviously played an important role in the present study, so

one possible explanation for this will be advanced:

A review of the

research on gender differences acquainted the investigator with a set
of theories which mesh quite well with the present findings.

It is

Alice Eagly's (1987) suggestion that one of the primary differences
between male and female social behavior is that male behavior is more

task oriented while female behavior is more social-emotional directed.

The result of this difference would be that females tend to devote
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more attention to social behavior while males devote more attention
to the task.

Those who seek to maintain a group would supposedly

attempt to promote social interaction and devote a little less

attention to the task.

In the present study, the males (who devote

more attention to the way in which the task is being accomplished,
according to Eagly, 1987) exhibited a great deal of improvement in

all conditions.

Females, on the other hand, actually failed to

achieve their practice level performance when participating in teams.

It is quite possible, given the above, that males were devoting their
complete attention to the task while the females (particularly the

high trusters) were placing their focus on what kind of person they

had supposedly been teamed with (as opposed to being concerned with
how well their teams were performing the task).

Such would be the

case if females were more attentive to the social behavior of their

partner.

Still another possibility is that the males may have been

taking a more personal interest in the task.

Greater devotion to the

task would seemingly promote not only personal interest, but also task

identity (the extent to which participants judge themselves based upon

how well they performed the task).

Regardless of the explanation,

males appeared to compensate for their partners in every condition,
while only the low trust females displayed compensation of any kind.
The high trust females actually loafed on trials 1 and 2.

One will recall that people have displayed a tendency to engage in
social compensation when they judge their partners to be incapable, so
it is rather important to mention at this point that team participants
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were told that they and their fictitious partners had set their own
performance standards during practice.

It should be safe to assume,

therefore, that partners were considered to be capable.

Some of the

various comments heard when feedback was first provided supports this
assumption quite well, for some were actually accusing their partners
of "slacking off".

Based upon the above, it is extremely unlikely

that participants judged their partners to be incapable, thus any

social compensation that occurred is more likely the result of other
factors (like low trust level).
The prediction that low trusters working within a team would

outperform all others was supported to some extent by the significant
simple interaction of Trust Level and Gender for team participants.
As previously noted, low trusters who participated in the team

condition showed a great deal more improvement than the group of high
trusters participating in the same conditions.

It is suggested here

that the low trusters (particularly females) were engaging in

social compensation (as predicted) and that their higher level of
improvement was a direct result of their social compensation.

While it was predicted that there would be several main effects,

the only significant main effect was that of Trial.

One principal

reason for this lack of main effects may be that participants did not
engage in the amount of social loafing observed in Kerr (1983):

It

would appear that participants accepted their performance standards

(their goal was to exceed practice performance) as realistic goals,

even though their performance was not described in concrete terms
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(they were not told how many unique locations they had circled).

The

above suggestion is supported by the fact that participants did not

complain or mention any reservations when they were asked to improve
upon their practice level performance.

It is quite possible that some

main effects were simply overshadowed by other effects, for the data
derived from the follow-up questionnaire provide indication that both
work condition and incentive level did affect the participants’ mood

levels.
One will recall that the reduction of social loafing may be

achieved by providing individual feedback and objective standards, but

there was some question about how specific the feedback and standards
must be.

Based upon present findings, it would appear that the

claimed use of such standards and the provision of only general
feedback will also prevent or deter social loafing to some extent.

The effects of other factors related to social loafing would naturally
be diminished.

The present study provides some support for Williams and Karau’s
theory that trust level mediates the amount of social compensation

exhibited within a group (at least for females).

It also supports

their conclusion that trust level and work condition will interact.
As previously mentioned, the incentive used in this study was

specifically chosen because it would theoretically have greater

influence than Kerr’s 25 cent reward (Williams and Karau suggested
that Kerr’s reward had very little impact).

The follow-up mood

inventory certainly indicates that the incentive had an effect upon
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participants.

It was, therefore, interesting to find that a high

trust females did not show significant improvement even when the

The urge to engage in social loafing may

incentive was provided.

have been one reason for this trend.

It would appear, based upon

the above, that the mere presence of a reward will not prevent social

loafing.

Conclusions

The results of the present study provide rather strong evidence
that social compensation takes place.

It particularly supports the

findings of Williams and Karau (1991), at least as far as female

behavior is concerned.

It further indicates that males may be more

apt to engage in social compensation, perhaps because males are more

task-oriented in general.
The data provides only weak support for other social loafing
research, for it appeared that only females engaged in such behavior

(low trust females performed much better than high trust females in
the team condition).

It is quite possible that the males may have

been placing so much attention on the task that they were not inclined
to loaf.

The different ways in which the genders responded to the

various conditions provides strong indication of gender differences.
Generalization of findings such as those previously described

would prove to be rather difficult due to the fact that one would
need to have some information about interpersonal trust levels, but
if one did, anyone with the capacity to reward behavior would be
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better equipped to decide which type of reinforcement would be most
appropriate under each different set of circumstances.

Further

research would certainly be beneficial.

Future Directions
Of all directions that follow-up research might take, one of the

more interesting might involve exploration of why gender interacted

as it did.

The theory that behavior was influenced by sex differences

(Eagly, 1987) appears to be quite viable under the circumstances.
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APPENDIX A

Follow-up Questionnaire
1.

Did any part of this experiment cause you to feel uncomfortable?
Yes /No.
If ”yes”, please indicate why you felt uncomfortable

2.

Can you recall what the outcome of each trial has been? Please
indicate how your team has done.
Trial 1: failed / succeeded
Trial 2: failed / succeeded

3.

Was it enjoyable to work with a partner on this task?
If "no", why not?

4.

Now that you have completed two trials, please use the following
set of scales to indicate how you feel. Circle a number on each
HAPPY
not at all 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
very
ANGRY
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
not at all 0
10
very
SATISFIED
3
7
not at all 0
1
2
4
5
6
8
9
10
very
DISAPPOINTED
7
not at all 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
very
CALM
3
7
1
2
4
5
6
8
9
not at all 0
10
very
EXCITED
7
9
2
8
not at all 0
1
3
4
5
6
10
very
FRUSTRATED
7
3
4
5
6
8
9
1
2
10
very
not at all 0
EMBARRASSED
7
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
1
2
not at all 0
very
PROUD
4
5
6
7
8
10
1
2
3
9
very
not at all 0
ASHAMED
7
4
5
6
2
3
8
9
10
1
not at all 0
very
THRILLED
7
4
5
6
8
10
2
3
9
very
1
not at all 0

Yes / No.

Signature

APPENDIX B

Debriefing Statement
Experimenter: Steve Bems
The experiment you have just participated in was designed to
examine factors thought to be associated with social loafing and
social compensation. Social loafing is what occurs when group
members allow others to do most of the work on a task even when
they are capable of contributing an equal share of the work.
Social compensation is what occurs when group members fear that
others will not contribute their fair share to a group task:
Compensators try to ensure that a task will get done by working
even harder (to compensate for the lower productivity of free
riders).
Participants were either asked to work by themselves or
with fictitious partners so that the effects of these social
phenomena might be examined. All partners were fictitious because
it was important to examine how participants would react to someone
who continuously loafs or free-rides.
It has been hypothesized that social loafing occurs less and that
social compensation occurs more as a task becomes more important:
The experimental task was made more important in the present study by
telling half of the participants that better performers would stand a
better chance of winning $20.
In actuality, all participants will
have the same chances of winning the single $20 prize (this includes
those who did not know that a prize existed).
It has also been hypothesized that trust level is associated with
one’s tendency to engage in social compensation, so trust level was
passively manipulated. Low trusters, in particular, are expected to
engage in social compensation.
It has already been noted that individual participants were
included in the present study. Still another control procedure was
to give all participants the same feedback in each trial. Feedback
could not be allowed to vary freely for each person, so a small amount
of deception was necessary. Regardless of actual performance, all
participants were told that they had succeeded on trials 1 and failed
on trial 2.
Deception was a necessary part of this study because there was no
other means to create the same experimental conditions.
It is very
important that you, as a participant and psychologist alike, under
stand that deception is only used when negative effects are extremely
unlikely, when the methodology has been approved by an ethics
committee, and when no other means exist. Consideration of
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participants is mandatory, in other words.
This type of research can be used to help managers decide which
type of reinforcement should be used in a given setting. When the
proper method of reinforcement is employed, work groups encounter
fewer internal conflicts and devote more attention to the task at
hand. Group managers who know how the above factors interact would
also seem to be better equipped to resolve conflicts which occur
within work groups: Conflicts may even be prevented if a worker's
personal contributions are either recognized or rewarded.

APPENDIX C
Informed Consent Form
I, the undersigned, understand that I am free to quit this
experiment at any time.
I understand that I can receive full
participation credit if I do choose to quit.
I also understand
that all information and responses I provide will be treated
confidentially.
In this study on time pressure, I/a partner and I will be
asked to find a word which appears on a page of scrambled letters
many times. The task I/my partner and I work on will involve
finding a word circling it, and re-attempting to find it in other
positions on copies of the same page.
I realize that the purpose
of this study will not be completely explained until the end of
this session.
I also understand that this session will take
approximately 45 minutes.

Signature
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APPENDIX D

SAMPLE TASK FORM

HORN

EGYHNUJMEDCHORNTGS
KQAZWSXEDCRFVFEQWR
DXETYHNGFSAXCBNROH
HORNOGCDSVHIYRHUKP
TWARRXDTYGOBJIOKHG
UTNVROCGKURJYTREFO
UYGFVPHLGQCAZWSXED
KOLNROHYTFVHNKMJND
UHFKRJKOGCUHBYGVRL
BODCDXSZRDTFYGHORN
GRFPHORNBNJBYTGNSA
BNLHBHWNROHVTFCRDX
IHGTEBXKDOYJFKCOML
BYOGFYHRXUGNLMYHBT
YDHRJHORNKRFTGRDNR
GCOHNKRJTOOYHORNLI
ASKJDFJIHLGTRMVDCR
HORNIYRVDCROYNUMIK
JUGQYKNROHHRBJPUBY
NJQAZWSXEDCOHIHORN
UTGBRFVEDCKLRUIYTW
IRFBQOHORNUWBCFPJN
YGUYTVDCSXLI JNUHBY
YGRFEDCYOBINOMVTHO
YGVCRFNROHYHNROH IT
ZTGTFCUHBI JNOKMPBV
ITGCFPAOSIDUFRMNRO
GHNVUTFEPKNUHGTFDJ
NROHPUHGTFRCFBNROH
LNIYHGVUHBOKNPKJUT
FCHTFRDFINROHYHUGY

XWEDCRFVTGBYHNUJM
YIHWQAZADGJOVSWCG
WHSGJITHQSRVWTNUK
OOLYEJTEONXLJMDWQ
TRFCHORNTRCLOYGMB
KNI JBUGCTFNUYHORN
CMJUFNBTRFVYGTFKR
HKPNBHLUPYTNROHBO
OVCRZKOHFSPIJHPJH
RPKOJFYRLHNGFVBNF
NLJBTOKFNPOGIYTRK
PLKIHVYGCMHRLOUOH
JGDAOOTUNROHNLJHT
HCPLRURNVTRFDHORN
OHGYNTRMRVNBYWPKR
RKBUTGKBVFOPKLBJO
PKTSVJYQNJZFIHTGH
PKIHYFNROHJTFOEQZ
VTCOKHOJLKOIYRGVF
KHTRFOVCDSKRLNROH
ROJKIRJHHFTEQKRUH
ROHDCXPOZMNROHBOQ
NVHKTFCRDXESWARQH
RNJOGYFNGRCTINQTF
OQFDCXSJRHVHNHVGC
HBVYHORNIOJBOPTCQ
HPEQPMUNTRECQRPGR
BKMIYPTRBNQSPBNHB
KIYHGBFCVDXJNOIUH
FGHJNROHIYTGHKJHT
GTRFGHJKLMIYGBFVD
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APPENDIX E

ANCOVA SUMMARY TABLE (BETWEEN SUBJECTS)

Effect

DF

F

Within Cells
WC
TL
Inc
Gdr
WC x TL
WC x Inc
WC x Gdr
TL x Inc
TL x Gdr
Inc x Gdr
WC x TL x Inc
WC x TL x Gdr
WC x Inc x Gdr
TL x Inc x Gdr
WC x TL x Inc x Gdr

63
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.96
2.47
.00
.08
1.67
1.91
1.19
.02
.55
.76
1.61
9.32
3.56
1.73
.06
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Sig of ]

.330
.121
.985
.775
.200
.172
.280
.902
.461
.385
.210
.003
.064
.193
.806

4

APPENDIX F

ANCOVA SUMMARY TABLE (WITHIN SUBJECTS)

Effect

Within Cells
T
WC x T
TL x T
Inc x T
Gdr x T
WC x TL x T
WC x Inc x T
WC x Gdr x T
TL x Inc x T
TL x Inc x T
Inc x Gdr x T
WC x TL x Inc x T
WC x TL x Gdr x T
WC x Inc x Gdr x T
TL x Inc x Gdr x T
WC x TL x Inc x Gdr x T

DF

F

128
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

4.84
.58
2.89
.10
4.12
.14
.57
.32
.15
.04
.45
1.30
.26
.17
.72
1.93

'
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Siq of F '

.009
.564
.059
.902
.018
.870
.569
.725
.862
.961
.638
.275
.770
.842
.488
.150

